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Abstract 
 
Since risk will always pose a threat of destabilization to financial institutions, an 
effective operational risk management system is essential for banks. Banks must ensure 
that the risks that could potentially have any significant impact could be detected and 
mitigated as early as possible in order to protect the interests of the company’s 
stakeholders. This study analyzes whether an operational risk management model was 
relevant to the BNP Paribas Global Markets Lisbon team through analyzing the team’s 
processes and the potential risks associated to those processes. If the model was in fact 
necessary, the objective was to develop a sound operational risk management model that 
would function to mitigate those identified risks. Ultimately, we find that there was, 
indeed, a need to implement an operational risk model to reduce or avoid the potential 
impact of the detected risks. This study fills a part of the research gap in that it provides 
a glimpse of the process of developing and implementing an operational risk and 
permanent control management structure at BNP Paribas Lisbon. Through identifying, 
evaluating and measuring the presence of operational risk, we established a risk map 
and designed an internal control system, as it pertained to the Global Markets Lisbon 
team, in order to foster a system that continually and systematically reduces the 
financial, reputational, and/or operational impact of these potential risks.  
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Resumo 
 
O risco representa uma ameaça constante de desestabilização das instituições 
financeiras. Desta forma, um sistema de gestão de risco operacional eficaz é essencial 
para o bom funcionamento dos bancos. Os bancos devem assegurar que os riscos que 
podem potenciar impactos significativos sejam detectados e mitigados o mais cedo 
possível, a fim de proteger os interesses dos stakeholders da empresa. Esta dissertação 
tem como objectivo analisar a aplicação de um modelo de gestão de risco operacional na 
equipa de Global Markets do BNP Paribas – Lisboa, e avaliar a sua relevância através 
da análise das tarefas realizadas pela equipa e dos potenciais riscos associados à sua 
actividade. Se o modelo for realmente necessário, o objectivo será desenvolver um 
modelo de gestão de risco operacional forte de forma a mitigar os riscos identificados. 
Em última análise, os resultados mostram que existia de facto a necessidade de 
implementar um modelo de risco operacional para reduzir e/ou evitar o potencial 
impacto dos riscos detectados. Este estudo preenche uma parte da lacuna na 
investigação uma vez que oferece um vislumbre do processo de desenvolvimento e 
implementação da gestão de risco operacional e estrutura de controle permanente na 
equipa de Global Markets do BNP Paribas Lisboa. Através da identificação, avaliação e 
quantificação da presença de risco operacional, foi estabelecido um mapa de risco que 
projetou um sistema de controlo interno, a fim de promover um sistema contínuo e que 
progressivamente vai reduzindo o possível impacto financeiro, reputacional e/ou 
operacional desses mesmos riscos identificados. 
 
Palavras-chave: Risco operacional, Gestão de Riscos, Investimento bancário, Plano de 
controle 
Classificação JEL: G20, G21, G24, G28
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Chapter I 
1. Introduction 
 
Risk is a persistent encumbrance that consistently casts an ominous threat to a 
financial institution’s stability. Risk can emerge in many forms, market, credit, and 
operational to name a few, and can strongly undermine a financial institution’s ability to 
sustain a steady progression of economic growth. In order to maneuver through the 
unpredictable and potentially perilous risks, financial institutions are required to develop 
systems that keep them cognizant of the level of risks that they are exposed to, as well as a 
capital buffer that would protect them against unanticipated losses. 
However, several of these systems emerged only after numerous financially 
catastrophic incidents called attention to the need for banks to improve their level of 
protection against risks. In 2008, several interconnected risks were within the epicenter of 
the mortgage backed securities that ignited a global financial crisis. In the early 2000s, 
several banks began strategically bundling mortgage loans and selling them as securities to 
investors in order to profit from a boom in the housing market, though, largely neglecting 
the looming credit risk. As interest rates rose so did the number of defaulted loans, which 
consequently increased the liquidity risk of all the banks involved. Lehman Brothers, the 
fourth largest investment bank in the United States at the time, was significantly impacted 
by these risks reporting a quarterly loss of $3.9 billion in September 2008 and ultimately 
filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, one of the largest in U.S. history (Ferrell et. al, 2010). 
Lehman Brothers’ collapse sent shockwaves throughout the global financial markets and 
was a large factor in what culminated into a severe global recession. 
In 2014, BNP Paribas, a global financial institution, was fined $8.97 billion for 
transactions conducted through the US financial system on behalf of Iranian, Sudanese, and 
Cuban entities, which were subject to U.S. economic sanctions (Kittrie, 2016). The 
Department of Justice stated that BNP Paribas had organized various elaborate schemes 
that were intended to deliberately mask their illicit transactions from U.S. regulators 
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(Kittrie, 2016). The financial penalty was reportedly the largest criminal fine ever imposed 
by the U.S. government. 
In the case of the Lehman Brothers collapse, a year prior to its downfall, 
management had accepted a large increase in their risk appetite limit in order to meet their 
ambitious growth strategy (Engelen, 2011). The bank’s excessive risk taking led it to have 
a leverage ratio that could not sustain the market illiquidity that arose from the mass 
defaults, which produced huge unanticipated losses for Lehman Brothers. The drastic losses 
and large leverage ratio damaged the bank's reputation and made it difficult for the bank to 
obtain funding that would sustain their day-to-day operations. By this point, it was a 
colossal domino effect that would ultimately lead to the bank’s demise. At the root of this 
downward spiral is an operational error that could have been avoided had there been 
effective operational risk management systems that weighed the potential consequences of 
a larger risk appetite.  
BNP Paribas’ case is an example of operational risk that ultimately proved costly to 
the bank. Operational risk involves the actions of the firm, its entities and its staff, which 
can lead to negatively impacting the reputation of the financial institution, as well as, 
investor confidence in the financial system. Both scenarios portray that it is pertinent for 
banks to adopt behaviors, practices, internal controls, and governance mechanisms that 
would prevent or reduce the imminent risks that can potentially have catastrophic 
consequences. Risks will always threaten to undermine a financial institution’s stability; 
however, it is ultimately the responsibility of these banks to enhance their operational risk 
management systems in order to better protect themselves against adverse events that could 
prove disastrous to its reputation, operation and finances.  
The objective of this study is to determine if an operational risk model is applicable 
to the BNP Paribas Global Markets Lisbon team. If it indeed is applicable, the second 
objective is to develop a sound operational risk management model for mitigating those 
identified potential risks. In order to develop a tailored operational risk model, we conduct 
an internal analysis of the processes performed by the teams in Lisbon. It is important to 
understand the processes performed by each team member in order to identify the risks, if 
any, involved in their procedures.  
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Ultimately, we determine that there was a need for the operational risk model to 
include some of the teams in Lisbon. Thus, we proceed with developing systematic 
procedures that will help reduce or avoid any potential risks. In order to develop a 
customized operational risk management system, we first construct a risk map that gauges 
the risks associated with particular processes performed by the Global Markets Lisbon 
team. Along with the risk map, we develop a control plan, in which the goal is to mitigate 
the potential impact of that particular risk. The frequency and a clear objective of the 
controls is defined and established according to the specific process. Therefore, the goal of 
the study is also to portray the various stages of building an operational risk management 
model that respects the standards imposed by the Basel Committee. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to describe these procedures as it pertains to BNP Paribas. 
Thus, this study provides a glimpse, however small, of BNP Paribas’ operational risk 
management processes. 
In the following chapter, we will discuss the Basel Committee, which was formed to 
develop regulatory standards intended to synchronize procedures of protecting against 
operational risk for all banks. We explain operational risk and the components that make up 
an effective operational risk management structure. Additionally, we provide a general 
overview of the risk management procedures that many banks have or should have 
implemented through the regulatory reforms established by the Basel Committee. In 
chapter three, we discuss the proposed calculation methods as set by the Basel Committee, 
as well as the most popular methodological approaches used among banks following the 
Basel Committee regulations. In chapter four, we delve into the analysis conducted within 
BNP Paribas, the organizational structure of the business and the process of developing a 
risk map and the subsequent control plan implementation. We explain in detail the internal 
control design, systems, procedures and processes that were created in order to mitigate the 
risks detected through the risk mapping process. We then discuss notable operational risk 
incidents that have highlighted the importance of an efficient operational risk management 
framework. In chapter five, we conclude. 
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Chapter II 
2. Literature Review 
 
 In this chapter, we will discuss the origins of the Committee that formed in order to 
enhance financial stability globally through preventing or diminishing the impact of the 
risks that had previously led to global crisis. The Committee aims to address these risks 
through introducing consistent risk management standard frameworks that fortify the 
regulatory system, supervision and practices of banks worldwide.  
The section following the introduction of the Committee explains the definition of 
operational risk and the purpose of developing an operational risk management system. The 
section thereafter presents the very first framework established by the Committee, the Basel 
I. The Basel I section delves into the standards set forth within the original structure as well 
as the criticisms that it faced. Thus, the subsequent section discusses the second revised 
framework, the Basel II, which aims to correct the ambiguities found within the Basel I. 
The last section explains the categories that the Basel Committee established in order for 
banks to identify the types of events or risks that banks face and that could negatively 
impact that entity.  
 
2.1 Regulatory Origins 
 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was born out of the international 
financial cataclysm that transpired in the 1970s due to the collapse of the Bretton Woods 
system in 1973 (BCBS, 2015). The financial market pandemonium led to several 
international banks incurring hefty foreign currency losses and for some permanently 
closing down (BCBS, 2015). Consequently, the central bank governors of the G10 
countries took proactive measures in response to the financial market turmoil and the 
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banks’ precarious position by establishing the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
(BCBS) at the end of 1974 (BCBS, 2015). The Committee was envisioned as a forum for 
systematic collaboration amongst its participating countries on banking supervisory matters 
and intended to improve financial stability through setting minimum standards for financial 
supervision and regulation of banking worldwide (BCBS, 2015). 
 Although the Committee’s decisions have no legal power, the Committee began, in 
2012, monitoring the execution of their supervisory standards and guidelines of its 
members to help advance the global banking system, stimulate public confidence and foster 
a fair regulatory system for internationally active banks (BCBS, 2015). The Committee is 
currently comprised of twenty-eight jurisdictions; central banks represent their 
corresponding countries and the authority with formal responsibility for the prudential 
supervision of banking business acts for the jurisdictions without a central bank (BCBS, 
2015).   
 
2.2 Operational Risk 
 
The Basel Committee defines Operational risk as “the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This 
definition includes legal risk, but excludes strategic and reputational risk” (BCBS, 2001). 
Therefore, according to the definition, there are four potential causes of operational risk: 
people, processes, systems and external events. The definition also includes legal risk, but 
disregards reputational and strategic risk (BCBS, 2001). 
Alexander (2003) best explains operational risk as comprising of all possible losses 
originating from operational inputs, internal processes and systems (including employees 
and equipment), downstream supply chain partners or customers, and external events. An 
efficient operational risk management framework should take into account all financial 
impacts even gains and near-misses in addition to losses and opportunity costs. Near-misses 
simply mean that the loss did not occur but it is important to record it because should the 
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event reoccur it does not necessarily mean that it would result in a near-miss again (BCBS, 
2011). 
The goal of an operational risk management framework is to identify any 
malfunctioning and/or risks that an entity may be exposed to, and ultimately, if feasible, 
thwarts their occurrence or represses the financial ramifications. There is also the 
regulatory aspect in that banks are required to declare all significant incidents to regulators. 
Lastly, the operational risk identification helps banks ensure that they have the necessary 
capital reserved for the worst-case scenario for operational risk (BCBS, 2011). 
 
2.2.1 Basel I 
 
Following the Latin American debt crisis in the 1980s, the Committee noticed a 
need for sturdier capital ratios and, thus, developed their first framework now referred to as 
Basel I (BCBS, 2015). The goal was to develop capital standards that would consolidate the 
measurement of capital adequacy for their banking systems worldwide. 
The Basel I set a minimum capital ratio of capital to risk weighted assets of eight 
percent (BCBS, 2008). Ultimately, this accord was implemented not only in the member 
countries but also in almost all countries with active international banks, which essentially 
removed competitive inequality due to differences in national capital requirements. The 
document was repeatedly modified throughout the 1990s but one important alteration was 
the Market Risk Amendment (BCBS, 2015). The Market Risk Amendment added a capital 
requirement for the market risks banks are exposed to into the framework, which up until 
then solely addressed credit risk (BCBS, 2015).  Subsequently, for the first time, banks 
were able to incorporate value-at-risk models, in addition to other quantitative parameters 
and qualitative standards, to assess their market risks and meet their market risk capital 
requirements (BCBS, 2015). 
 Overall, the Basel I was executed fairly effortlessly amongst the Basel Committee 
jurisdictions, except for Japan, which took a bit longer to effectuate the accord due to 
suffering a banking crisis in the late 1980’s that hampered its ability to swiftly implement 
the Basel I (Balin, 2008). Notwithstanding its rather smooth implementation, Basel I is not 
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free of criticism on account of several observed limitations. One main criticism is that 
although the accord recognized that banks must protect itself against other kinds of risk, 
Basel I only addressed the credit risk its member G-10 states, all developed markets, were 
potentially exposed to (Tarullo (2008), Balin (2008)). Therefore, Basel I not only excluded 
banks operating outside of developed markets from its scope, but also focused on one sole 
risk, essentially leaving banks exposed to a wide spectrum of risks. Another criticism was 
the generality and absoluteness of the standards that left a chasm in Basel I’s risk 
weightings and allowed banks to maneuver around the benchmarks in order to acquire 
higher risks than what was originally designed by the Basel I (Balin, 2008). These 
shortcomings led the Basel committee to acknowledge a demand for an enhanced 
framework that could better ensure ample financial stability in the international financial 
system (Balin, 2008). Consequently, revisions of the Basel I ultimately yielded the Basel II. 
 
2.2.2 Basel II 
 
The Basel Committee introduced a revised version of the Basel I in 1999, 
commonly referred to as Basel II, which was meant to rectify some of the loopholes found 
in the original framework (BCBS, 2015). Basel II further expands the “pillar” framework 
established in Basel I in order to broaden the scope, technicality, and dimensions of the 
Basel Accord (Balin, 2008). The Basel II is founded on three pillars: 
 
I. Minimum Capital Requirements 
II. Supervisory Review 
III. Market Discipline 
 
 The minimum capital requirements pillar is comprised of three components: the 
delineation of regulatory capital, risk-weighted assets, and the minimum ratio of capital to 
risk-weighted assets (Balin, 2008). The risks have been categorized as follows: 
 
1. Credit risk 
2. Market risk 
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3. Operational irsk 
4. Liquidity risk 
5. Legal risk 
 
Basel II clearly defines separate minimum capital requirements for operational risk. For 
operational risk, a bank has the flexibility to build internal models to assess the bank’s 
operational risk profile and determine the minimum regulatory capital requirements. 
 The second pillar, Supervisory review process, puts an emphasis on the supervision 
of the bank’s capital adequacy, externally and internally (Balin, 2008). The overall arching 
principal is that banks must oversee all operational risk events and have internal risk 
management systems that are ethical and transparent to banking supervisors. Not only 
would this system help identify and understand past and potential future operational risk 
events but also would help a bank spot preventable risks or areas of mitigating the impact. 
 Market discipline, the third pillar, encourages banks to disclose what previously was 
only available to regulators, such as a bank’s risk exposures, capital, risk assessment 
processes, etc. (Tarullo, 2008). Under Basel II’s standards, it is recommended that banks 
release quarterly statistics related to the aggregate amounts of surplus capital (both Tier 1 
and Tier 2) the bank holds, risk-weighted capital sufficiency ratios, reserve requirements 
for credit, market, and operational risk, and a complete explanation with expectations of the 
risk reduction methods the bank has (Tarullo, 2008). By having the information available to 
the public, Basel II hopes to endow shareholders with the ability to compel banks to take 
particular restraints in their risk taking actions and their reserve holding approaches (Balin, 
2008). In this way, if a bank is taking huge risks but has proportionally few reserves then 
shareholders could take action and punish these banks for doing so.  
Current events and criticism of the Basel II have shown a profound need for an updated 
Basel framework even prior to the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. 
Consequently, the Basel III was released relatively recently but has yet to be implemented 
by all banks (BCBS, 2015). Since many banks are still currently implementing the Basel II 
accord and have up until 2018 to switch to Basel III, the scope of this research has been 
restricted within the Basel II framework. 
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2.3 Operational Risk: Basel event types 
The Committee categorized seven Level 1 event types nomenclature, which are the 
types of incidents that will be used to calculate operational risk (BCBS, 2006). Defining an 
event is critical to analyzing its impact as well as the likelihood of it occurring again, 
particularly for the frequency/severity approach. The Basel regulations demarcated these 
even type levels; however a bank could feel free to implement an internal sub-level if it saw 
it appropriate. 
 
The level 1 event types are: 
1. Internal fraud 
2. External fraud 
3. Employment practices and workplace safety 
4. Customers, Products and Commercial Practices 
5. Damage to physical assets 
6. Business disruption & system failures 
7. Execution, delivery and Process Management 
 
To further clarify the event types, the following are some examples and/or 
explanations for each of the event types that could occur. Although the definition of fraud 
varies, it essentially revolves around some sort of deception that has intentionally been 
committed (Shevchenko, 2011). Internal fraud would entail falsification of information 
from a staff member such as tax evasion, money laundering and embezzlement 
(Shevchenko, 2011). External fraud, as the name implies, are external factors such as an 
outside party forging documents, hacking, and stealing internal information (Shevchenko, 
2011). Employment practices and workplace safety would encompass any sort of 
discrimination, or actions that could lead to a lawsuit for example (Shevchenko, 2011). 
Customers, Products and Commercial Practices deal with market manipulation, breach of 
market rules, or improper trades, etc. Damage to physical assets would include terrorist 
attacks that affect the company, vandalism, or natural disasters (Shevchenko, 2011). 
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Business disruption and system failures would be anything that causes an employee to not 
perform the necessary processes for the job, such as IT issues (Shevchenko, 2011). Lastly, 
execution, delivery and Process Management is anything that deals with the actual 
execution of processes, such as inserting the wrong data, accounting errors, or losing a 
client’s assets (Shevchenko, 2011). The figure below summarizes the Basel II Accord 
Framework and portrays the scope of this research as it pertains to the framework. 
 
Figure 1: Basel II Framework 
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Chapter III 
3. Methodological Framework 
 
This chapter discusses the methodological framework that the Basel Committee 
established for banks to compute the capital buffer needed to cover events that could lead to 
unexpected losses for the bank. After the proposed calculation measurements are 
introduced, we discuss the necessary data elements that the Basel Committee has set as 
essential for banks to have a comprehensive and effective capital calculation approach. 
Thereafter, we briefly introduce two popular calculation approaches that banks 
implementing the third proposed measurement use to compute the necessary capital.    
3.1 Basel II: the proposed calculation methods 
 
There are three proposed measurement methodologies for calculating operational 
risk capital charges. Progressing from complexity and risk sensitivity, they are: the Basic 
Indicator Approach, the Standardized Approach, and the Advanced Measurement 
Approaches (BCBS, 2006). The Basic Indicator Approach is denoted as follows: 
 
                                       𝐾𝐵𝐼𝐴 = [∑(𝐺𝐼1…𝑛x 𝛼)] 𝑛⁄                          (1) 
 
where 𝐾𝐵𝐼𝐴 is the operational risk capital charge, GI is the annual gross income, where 
positive, over the previous three years, n is the number of the previous three years for 
which gross income is positive, and 𝛼 is 15%, which is a weighting coefficient set by the 
Basel Committee (BCBS, 2006). Thus, there are no specific eligibility criteria for Banks in 
this approach and the average Net Banking Income is the only indicator. The weighting 
coefficient is related to the industry wide level of required capital to the industry wide level 
of the indicator (BCBS, 2006). 
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 The Standard Approach separates itself from the Basic Indicator Approach in that 
the former approach determines the amount of cash a bank must have to protect itself 
through splitting the bank into specific business lines as defined by the Committee (BCBS, 
2006). The business lines are stated as follows: corporate finance, trading & sales, retail 
banking, commercial banking, payment & settlement, agency services, asset management, 
and retail brokerage (BCBS, 2006). The approach can be expressed as 
                             
                                 𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐴 = {∑𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 1−3𝑚𝑎𝑥[∑(𝐺𝐼1−8𝑥𝛽1−8), 0]} 3⁄                                 (2) 
 
where the operational risk capital charge, 𝐾𝑇𝑆𝐴, depends on the 𝐺𝐼1−8, the annual gross 
income in a given year, as outlined in the Basic Indicator Approach, for each of the eight 
business lines, and on a Beta, 𝛽1−8, also for each of the eight business lines (BCBS, 2006). 
The beta is predetermined by the Committee and is weighted against the gross income of 
each of the eight business lines within the company to assess the level of required capital 
(BCBS, 2006). The values of the betas, detailed in Table 1, suggest the risk related to the 
business lines.  
 
Table 1- Standardized Approach Reserve Targets 
 
Source: BCBS (2006) 
 
Similar to the Basic Indicator Approach, there is only one weighting coefficient: the 
average Net Banking Income for each business line, over the last three years (BCBS, 2006). 
However, unlike the Basic Indicator Approach, there are eligibility criteria for the 
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Standardized Approach. In order to qualify for use of the Standardized Approach, a bank 
must satisfy the following criteria: 
 
 Its management must be actively involved in the supervision of the operational risk 
management framework; 
 The bank has implemented an operational risk management system 
 The bank has implemented a well-organized and documented risk management 
framework, such as a set of procedures, risk mapping, etc. 
 The bank has sufficient funds for the management and maintenance of this 
framework. 
 
The Advanced Measurement Approach (AMA) allows banks to develop their own 
internal framework and calculate the necessary reserves for operational risks through taking 
into account the bank’s particular risks (BCBS, 2006). The Standardized Approach criteria 
also apply in this approach and there must be a review of the model and its documents 
through an independent audit and a systematic validation by the supervisor (BCBS, 2006). 
The goal of the AMA is for banks to develop capital reserves that are more pertinent to the 
bank’s actual risk profile (BCBS, 2006). 
In order to implement this framework, regulators must eventually approve the final 
measurement approach (Balin, 2008). Ultimately, the internal models are expected to 
exhibit precision within the Basel II Accord risk matrix, i.e. the eight aforementioned 
business lines by the seven event types (BCBS, 2006). The AMA strategy employed should 
weigh internal operational loss data, external operational loss data, scenario analysis and 
factors that expose the business environment and the internal control systems through a 
clear, sound, and verifiable approach (BCBS, 2006).  
The loss distribution approach (LDA) and the scenario-based approach (SBA) are 
the two most popular AMA models used (BCBS, 2011). Although these models differ, 
there are four data elements in which the underlying principle would be generally valid for 
either. 
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3.2 The Four Data Elements 
 Banks utilizing the AMA are required to use four data elements, which are: internal 
loss data, external data, scenario analysis, and business environment and internal control 
factors (BEICFs) (BCBS, 2011). These four data elements would not only provide insight 
to a bank’s risk profile, it would also help with risk quantification, risk management, 
accounting and other types of reporting.  The following sections give a brief description of 
each of the four data elements, which have been obtained from the Basel 2011 Operational 
Risk Consultative Document. 
3.2.1 Internal loss Data 
 
Out of the four data elements, internal loss data may be the most valuable because it 
provides a record of the bank’s actual losses, thus making it the best representation of the 
bank’s business risk profile and risk management practices (BCBS, 2011). Within the 
operational risk measurement system, the internal loss data would help in estimating the 
loss frequencies and, along with the external data, would aid in attuning the severity 
distribution (BCBS, 2011). The internal loss data offers a base for the bank’s scenarios 
within its own risk profile and also acts as an input into the scenario analysis since it is a 
bank’s actual loss occurrence.  
 For banks following the AMA standard, The Basel II Framework proposes that 
banks gather internal data over a minimum period of five years, in order to calculate the 
capital charge (BCBS, 2011). However, if the bank has just qualified for the AMA 
standard, then a three-year period of accumulated internal data is acceptable (BCBS, 2011). 
In any event, many banks’ high severity internal loss events are insufficient to inform the 
tail of the distributions for producing significant evaluations of capital needs (BCBS, 
2011).  This is where external data and/or scenario analysis are essential. 
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3.2.2 External Loss Data 
 
 External loss data’s intended use is to enhance the internal data since it would 
provide additional information on large losses that particular bank may not have 
experienced. External data offers insight on the losses experienced in the industry as a 
whole. Thus, external data can be used to estimate the loss severity since the data contains 
important information to inform the tail of the loss distributions (BCBS, 2011). 
Furthermore, external data would serve as supplementary inputs into scenario analysis 
(BCBS, 2011).   
 Nonetheless, external data is publicly obtained and as result would have reporting 
biases embedded in its information (BCBS, 2011). Furthermore, the data is sourced from 
differing banks and may not necessarily have relevant information for the risk profile of the 
specific bank utilizing the data (BCBS, 2011).  Therefore, each bank should have outlined 
methodologies for counteracting the biases, evaluating its pertinence and scaling the loss 
quantities as applicable. Scaling tailors the external data loss amounts to the bank’s actual 
business activities and risk profile.  
 
3.2.3 Scenario Analysis 
 
 Differing from internal and external data, scenario analysis provides predictive 
analysis of events that have yet to happen to expose potential operational risk exposures 
(BCBS, 2011).  Having a strong scenario analysis is a critical component of the operational 
risk management framework. Using internal data and external data to inform the scenario, 
the process will be subjective by nature and will contain substantial ambiguities (BCBS, 
2011).  The output of the model would portray these ambiguities through providing a range 
for the estimate of the capital requirements (BCBS, 2011). Therefore, scenario uncertainties 
offer an instrument for estimating a suitable level of caution in deciding the final capital 
requirements. 
 Consequently, banks need to establish a strong governance framework that ensures 
the integrity and consistency of the estimates provided by the scenario analysis. According 
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to the Supervisory Guidelines for the Advanced Measurement Approaches (BCBS, 2011), 
in the recognized scenario framework, supervisors will discern the following features: 
 
(a) A clearly defined and repeatable process; 
(b) Good quality background preparation of the participants for the scenario 
generation workshop; 
(c) Qualified and experienced facilitators with consistency in the facilitation 
process; 
(d) The appropriate representatives of the business, subject matter experts and the 
corporate operational risk management function as participants involved in the 
workshop; 
(e) A structured process for the selection of data used in developing scenario 
estimates; 
(f) High quality documentation, which provides clear reasoning and evidence 
supporting the scenario output; 
(g) A robust independent challenge process and oversight by the corporate 
operational risk management function to ensure the appropriateness of scenario 
estimates; 
(h) A process that is responsive to changes in both the internal and external 
environment;  
(i) Mechanisms for mitigating biases inherent in scenario processes. Such biases 
include anchoring, availability and motivational biases. 
 
3.2.4 Business Environment and Internal Control Factors 
 
 The BEICFs, similar to the scenario analysis, are also forward-looking evaluations 
that are also subjective, which poses a challenge when integrating into the capital model 
(BCBS, 2011). BEICFs provide evaluations of business risk factors and the bank’s internal 
control setting (BCBS, 2011).  
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 Generally, there is an established quantification framework and BEICFs are used as 
an indirect input and as an “ex-post” modification to the model output (BCBS, 2011). This 
modification could result in an adjustment of a rise or cut in AMA capital charge at a group 
or business line level. However, due to its subjectivity a bank should have procedures that 
limit and justify the extent of the adjustment (BCBS, 2011). When compared over a period 
of time to the ILD, the direction and magnitude of the adjustments should be suitable 
(BCBS, 2011). 
 
3.3 Internal Measurement Approach 
 
  The Internal Measurement Approach aims to integrate the specific bank’s internal 
loss data into the calculation of the required capital (BCBS, 2001). Through the internal 
measurement approach, individual banks have the power to use their own judgment in 
deciding how to use their internal data, while supervisors establish the technique for 
computing the required capital that is uniform. To assure the integrity of the measurement 
approach, data quality, and the competence of the internal control environment, supervisors 
would need to enforce quantitative and qualitative standards (BCBS, 2001).  
 The capital charge for the operational risk of the bank is determined through a set of 
procedures under the Internal Measurement Approach. First, the activities conducted in the 
bank need to be separated by business lines, which can be the same as those suggested in 
the Standardized Approach (BCBS, 2001). Additionally, a cluster of general operational 
loss types should be delineated and applied across those business lines (BCBS, 2001). 
Thereafter, a supervisor defines an exposure indicator (EI) for each business line/loss type 
combination, which serves as a proxy for the size or amount of each business line’s 
operational risk exposure (BCBS, 2001). Then, depending on the bank’s internal loss data, 
two parameters are determined: Probability of loss event (PE), which is the likelihood of 
the occurrence of loss events and the Loss given that event (LGE), which is the amount or 
exposure that would be consumed as loss given that event (BCBS, 2001). The product of 
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these three variables, EI, LGE and PE, would yield the expected loss (EL) for each of the 
business line/loss type combination (BCBS, 2001). 
 In order to translate the expected loss into a capital charge, the supervisor supplies a 
“gamma term” for each business line/loss type combination (BCBS 2001),  
 
                    𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 = ∑𝑖∑𝑗[𝛾(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝐸𝐼(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝑃𝐸(𝑖, 𝑗) ∗ 𝐿𝐺𝐸(𝑖, 𝑗)]              (3) 
 
where i is the business line and j is the risk type, and the 𝛾 is a constant that is used to 
convert the EL into risk or the capital charge (BCBS, 2001). The measure of 𝛾  is 
established and fixed for each business line/loss type by the supervisors (BCBS, 2001).  
However, there are several issues that the Committee recognized needed to be 
resolved within the internal measurement approach. In order for there to be a standard 
approach globally across banks, there needed to be a consistent method for deciding what 
constituted as an operational risk loss event (BCBS, 2001). Furthermore, the internal data 
obtained may not necessarily truly represent the bank’s risk profile.   
 
3.3.1 The Loss Distribution Approach 
 
The LDA is a popular and more advanced version of the “internal methodology” 
that also satisfies the AMA standards (BCBS, 2011). Using the LDA, banks can calculate 
the probability distributions for the operational risk losses for each business line or event 
type over the period of one year (Shevchenko, 2011). Each bank can and should customize 
their LDA measures around their entities related risks but it is also important that they fall 
within the regulatory guidelines. 
Frachot et al. (2001) describes step by step how to reconcile quantitative and 
qualitative aspects of the data in order to implement the Loss Distribution Approach in 
practice. According to Frachot et al. (2001) there are five steps to implementing the LDA: 
 
 Severity Estimation 
 Frequency Estimation 
P a g e  | 19 
 
 Capital Charge Computation 
 Confidence Interval 
 Self-Assessment and Scenario Analysis 
 
The severity is, in regards to financial loss, the impact of the event whereas the frequency is 
the number of loss events that occurred within a certain time period (Alexander, 2003). The 
severity estimation is a calibration of the impact of each event that takes into account the 
complexities of the existing reporting bias in the data (Frachot et al., 2001). Once the bank 
has established the severity distribution and the frequency distribution then an empirical 
approximation of the total loss distribution could be determined through Monte Carlo 
simulation, which is the capital charge (Frachot et al., 2001). Since the capital charge is an 
estimation, the confidence interval is a tool used to justify the computed capital charge 
(Frachot et al., 2001). The Self-Assessment and Scenario Analysis are the same as the 
Scenario Analysis and BEICFs that had been previously discussed. 
 
Figure 2: Loss Distribution Approach 
 
  
Dutta and Perry (2007) take a different approach by first understanding how to 
appropriately measure operational risk rather than evaluating whether certain techniques 
can be used for a particular institution. This is important because institutions typically use 
the results of their operational risk measurements to estimate the capital to hold as reserves 
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for possible operational losses. This means that the measurements used should accurately 
capture the actual risk exposures that the institution is vulnerable to. Dutta and Perry (2007) 
evaluated the frequently used methods, found them to be inadequate in regards to the 
goodness-of-fit tests effectuated and thus introduced a new technique that they found to 
perform insurmountably better than the other models they tested. The new technique, g-
and-h distribution, modeled the whole severity range with one distribution and fit the data 
and results providing reliably realistic capital estimates.  
Chapelle et al. (2008) analyze the main obstacles banks face when implementing 
the AMA to evaluate operational risk. They studied four categories of two business lines, 
“Asset management” and “Retail banking”, and two event types, “Clients, products and 
business practices” and “Execution, delivery and process management”, of a large financial 
institution. They developed a matrix where in each cell they calibrated two truncated 
distributions functions. One distribution function described the “normal” losses and the 
other portrays the “extreme” losses. Through examining the risk adjusted return on capital 
(RAROC) to understand how operational risk management influences bank profitability, 
Chapelle et. al (2008) found that active management techniques would result in significant 
savings for the bank. 
 
Table 2: Methodological Approaches to Capital Estimation  
Approaches Methods Results Studies 
Search for how to appropriately 
measure operational risk prior to 
choosing a technique. 
Use a new technique: 
g-and-h distribution 
New model provides reliably 
realistic capital estimates 
that are superior to estimates 
provided by other previously 
used models.  
Dutta and 
Perry (2007) 
Studied 4 categories of 2  business 
lines, and 2 event types of a large 
financial institution 
Developed a matrix: 
each cell is calibrated 
by two truncated 
distributions functions. 
Active management 
techniques would result in 
significant savings for the 
bank. 
Chapelle et 
al. 
Comprehensive look at technical 
issues of implementing LDA 
Loss Distribution 
Approach 
Confidence intervals are 
useful tools to address the 
capital estimation. 
Frachot et al. 
(2001) 
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Chapter IV 
4. Operational Permanent Control Project 
 
In this chapter, we introduce the corporate profile and global organizational 
structure of BNP Paribas, globally, as well as in Portugal. We dive deeper into the 
organizational structure by specifically describing the Department, team in which the 
Traineeship falls under, as well as the Traineeship role itself. Thereafter, we discuss the 
process of developing theoretical risk maps and controls as it pertains to hypothetical teams 
at BNP Paribas Lisbon. Subsequently, we explain in detail the procedures that creating a 
control model for Front Officers entails. Lastly, we discuss notorious financial cataclysmic 
events that could have been mitigated or completely avoided through an efficient 
operational risk management system. 
4.1 Corporate Profile: About BNP PARIBAS 
 
 BNP Paribas is a large French multinational bank and financial services provider that 
offers a range of banking and financial solutions serving the needs of individuals, and 
commercial, corporate and institutional clients. Though the bank has its headquarters in 
Paris, it has a global footprint, with banks, service centers, and operations in seventy-five 
countries across Europe, the Middle East, Africa, the Americas, and the Asia-Pacific.  
BNP Paribas Group has more than 189,000 employees, with more than half based in 
the bank’s four European ‘domestic’ markets: Belgium, France, Italy and Luxembourg 
(BNP Paribas, 2015).  BNP Paribas is a leader in banking and financial services in Europe. 
Since it is one of the biggest banking groups across the world, it has a high brand visibility. 
It has cultivated a strong brand name and reputation, which in turn facilitated its good 
financial positioning. 
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Figure 3: Map of BNP Paribas’ Global Operations 
 
 
Source: BNP Paribas Annual Report (2014) 
 
4.1.2 BNP Paribas in Portugal 
 
Since 1985, BNP Paribas has been the sole operating French bank branch in 
Portugal and its one of the biggest foreign organizations in the country. It functions through 
nine affiliates and branches and covers the Group’s two main businesses: Corporate and 
Institutional Banking, and International Retail Banking & Services. These two core 
activities are complementary and provide a strong foundation for BNP’s strategy and assure 
financial robustness. 
BNP Paribas Portugal provides services to the corporate and institutional clients 
ranging in diverse areas: capital markets, structured finance, commercial banking, asset 
management, securities services, leasing, factoring, account services and vehicle 
management services. Moreover, the bank offers financial services to different group 
entities locally and internationally; in Portugal particularly, the bank is principally 
positioned to service big companies, multinationals, financial organizations and 
institutional investors.  
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4.1.3 Traineeship Organization 
 
 Within the two core activities, Retail Banking and Services and Corporate and 
Institutional Banking (CIB), the traineeship belongs to CIB. BNP Paribas’ CIB operates in 
45 countries, has almost 20,000 employees, and is in the forefront of investment banking in 
Europe (BNP Paribas, 2015). CIB offers financing, advisory and capital markets services 
and is split into three business lines: BNP Paribas Securities Services, Corporate Banking, 
and Global Markets (BNP Paribas, 2015). The traineeship falls under the Global Markets 
OPC & TAC Coordination team.  
 
4.1.4 Department Overview  
 
CIB offers capital market business through its Global Markets department, which 
provides solutions across asset classes, and industry-leading services for clients including 
Institutional, corporates, private banks and retail distribution networks. Global Markets is 
comprised of seven global business lines; G10 Rates, Equity Derivatives, Forex & Local 
Markets, Commodity Derivatives, Credit, Prime Solutions & Financing and Primary 
Markets.  
The Global Markets department aims to serve their franchise of clients though 
exposing efficient ways to raise and invest capital as well as manage their exposure to 
risk. Global Markets employs over 3,700 staff globally throughout Europe, Middle East, 
Africa, the Americas and Asia Pacific. With the main trading floors located in London, 
Hong Kong, New York, Paris, Singapore and Tokyo.  
 
4.1.5 Operational Permanent Control Process Overview 
 
The Global Markets Operational Permanent Control, OPC from here on, team 
ensures that all processes comply with CIB methodologies, tools and standards, as well as 
are in accordance with specific market regulations. There are several missions that the team 
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handles that could be split into four areas: Validation Process, Risk reduction, Control 
Plans, and Governance and Reporting.   
The OPC team ensures that validation process complies with the CIB practice and 
supports the Committee Chairman. Under this process, the team performs operational risk 
assessment encountered by any new activity. Thus, the team should coordinate the approval 
policies under the business responsibility and ensure that all processes, transactions, 
strategies, etc., adhere to it. 
Debatably the biggest area the OPC team is concerned with is risk reduction. 
Reducing the risk profile entails monitoring and analyzing historical incidents and the 
related action plans. In addition to the historical incidents, it is important to create and 
maintain a record of potential incidents. The team should monitor and follow-up 
recommendations from internal and external audits that expose certain business 
vulnerabilities. In order to implement an adequate control plan, the team must perform risk 
assessment according to the processes, risks, and controls approach and, ultimately, 
develop the operational risk cartography.   
The OPC team is in charge of designing, building, implementing and continually 
improving the control plans. The control plans should be cohesive for all business lines and 
regions and must obey the practices, policies, guidelines, etc. The team must also ensure 
that there are tools in place to ensure materialization of the controls, related indicators and 
the possibility to escalate issues relating to the controls. Following the implementation of 
the controls, the OPC team needs to supervise, monitor and report the deployment of the 
controls, and ensure a constant progression of adherence to them. The OPC team should 
consistently look to strengthen the control set up through the implementation of risk 
reduction actions and solutions. Additionally, in order to reinforce the internal control set 
up, all projects, regulatory or internally driven, need to have a provision of advisory and 
coordination established by the OPC team. 
Following the controls, the OPC team needs to set up and run efficient governance 
and reporting systems. The governance on both a global and regional level should be 
developed through reports or dashboards, and regular meetings with Front Officers, Internal 
Control Committees, Business Partners and the list goes on.  
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4.1.6 OPC Analyst Trainee Overview 
 
As an OPC Analyst Trainee, the goal was to ensure that both Operational Risk and 
Permanent Controls areas completely met their objectives and requirements in an efficient, 
precise and timely manner. The processes entailed: 
 
 Providing analysis and reports by performing data extraction and 
updating, analyzing, manipulating, reporting and formatting;  
 Collecting and analyzing data, as well as structuring queries and 
performing routine maintenance of reports; 
 Developing special reporting templates to develop new reports; 
 Ensuring data input and chasing those responsible to update the data; 
 Producing reports in an efficient and timely manner; 
 Provide analysis on process, risk review and risk reduction programs. 
 
In addition to these processes, we were responsible for developing and 
implementing relevant risk cartography and an adequate control plan for the Global 
Markets Lisbon Front Office team. The following section will delve deeper into the process 
of building, executing and completing this project. 
 
4.2 Operational Risk Management 
 
OPC, a first line of defense, must be developed in order to properly manage 
operational risk. The role of the OPC is to develop and implement the operational risk and 
permanent control management structure. Thus, OPC would go through the process of 
identifying, evaluating and measuring the risks and then developing procedures and 
controls to contain these risks.  
 The OPC team should separate an operational risk incident by the cause, the event, 
and the effect. The ability to reduce the frequency of an incident occurring and the severity 
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of its impact when it occurs, or even preventing an incident from occurring all together 
originates from understanding and managing the causes of previous and potential events. 
By identifying where the causes are located within vital activities allows the team to take 
fitting corrective actions. Subsequently, analyzing the development of previous and 
potential events enables the operational risk management in that it provides clues that will 
allow the team to anticipate potential events or recognize warning signs that reveal an 
inadequate or defective procedure. Lastly, the effects are the consequences of the event 
occurring, typically represented in a financial impact to the entity. By monitoring and 
reporting incidents, it becomes easier to see if the objective of the operational risk 
management is being met, which is to reduce the effects of the unfavorable events. 
 Operational risk management is a precise risk reduction scheme that must be 
defined in such a way that prioritizes the avoidance, mitigation or transference of the most 
undesirable risks. There are certain risks that an entity may decide to tolerate due to factors 
such as lower financial impact and those should also be predefined within a risk mapping 
scheme. 
 
4.2.1 Operational Risk Cartography 
 
The goal of mapping operational risk is to identify the focal areas of core risks the 
entity is exposed to, as well as evaluating the residual risk, once the actual permanent 
control framework and dynamic risk indicators have been taken into account (BCBS, 
2003). Risk mapping is an organizational framework that facilitates a systematic approach, 
with some standardized components, to detecting and measuring operational risks (BCBS, 
2003). Once identified and assessed, risk mapping also ensures that the risks produced by 
daily work activities are formalized and disclosed in a transparent manner. Furthermore, 
risk mapping helps the entity to identify opportunities where it can take counteractive 
actions to rectify any potential weaknesses. 
  In order for risk mapping to be effective, it must first swiftly provide an all-
encompassing assessment of the central areas of risks posed to the company. Thereafter, a 
methodical approach to controlling these risks and a way to evaluate the efficacy of the 
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approach should be implemented. Risk mapping should also be equipped with robust and 
adaptive follow up indicators customized for the specific risks involved. Lastly, an 
exhaustive risk mapping system would emphasize key areas of improvement through 
providing and consolidating essential information that allows for faster detection. 
 
4.2.2 Controls 
 
 A control is designed to increase the likelihood of reaching a predetermined 
objective while simultaneously managing the risks surrounding the main tasks that must be 
performed in order to achieve those objectives (BCBS, 2003). By establishing controls that 
a Front Officers would validate or reject creates a line of communication that facilitates 
detecting vulnerabilities more efficiently. This validation can be done prior to the execution 
of the operation or process, which is designed to evade a particular risk or incident, or it can 
be carried out afterwards, in order to abridge or circumvent completely the impact of an 
incident. 
 In order for controls to be effective, there must be a formalized set of procedures. 
The procedure for controls would specify not only its goal but also why it is relevant to the 
particular processes. Controls should also have a management follow-up system that would 
enable managers to identify ways to reduce the detected risks (Chorafas, 2004). Therefore, 
a control plan is a group of controls that are customized to the specific team’s or front 
officer’s main processes and risks. 
 
4.2.3 Risks and controls 
 
An effective control prevents the potential risks or curbs their impact through early 
detection (BCBS, 2003). The control does not necessarily have to protect against 
operational risk, it can include various other risks such as credit risk, market risk, and 
liquidity risk, to name a few.  
In order to create an effective control, there must first be an analysis of measuring 
the risks that the organization is exposed to (Scandizzo, 2005). The intensity of the control 
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should be consistent with the level of risk and with the organization’s risk tolerance 
(BCBS, 2003). Thus, the greater the risk, the higher the intensity of the control should be. 
The intensity could be set in various different ways. For example, if an operation or 
procedure has an intrinsic risk that is low, the frequency of the control can be low and 
solely the person performing the action can be set to validate it. However, the higher the 
risk and its potential impact, the more controls are needed that supersede a simple self-
control, and may even involve other players, such as the management or a dedicated team, 
considered a first level control, and/or independent permanent control functions, which 
would be second level controls.   
When assessing the risks involved, there should be a spectrum or a certain mapping 
that would place the risks by the level of impact that it could potentially have on the entity 
from lowest to highest. If the risk could have a substantial impact on the assets, reputation 
or results of the organization, it would be considered a major risk, and the control covering 
it would also be considered essential. Thus, controls would also be ranked on a scale 
proportionate to the evaluation of the corresponding fundamental risks. 
 Ultimately, the systematic analysis of the controls identified follow a risk mapping, 
but it also needs to be congruous with the AMA approach and the quantified potential 
incidents in each entity. When taking all the entities as one, there are several processes that 
inherently expose banks to particular risks. For example, if people miss a particular 
training, the exposure to human error would, in theory, increase. Thus, there are certain 
generic controls that would pertain to all departments and people. Therefore, most Business 
Units should have control plans that would have a set of both, generic controls and 
customized controls, founded on the assessed risks and the subsequent mapping, and match 
the units risk tolerance level.  
 
4.3 Project Process 
 In order to prepare the most effective controls, we scheduled meetings with every 
team so that they could explain their procedures on a deeper and more detailed level. In this 
way, we could obtain a comprehensive understanding of the processes that they are 
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performing and recognize the potential operational risks that they posed to the bank. Once 
we analysed and the potential risks were mapped, we developed internal controls with the 
goal of mitigating or possibly eliminating these risks. 
The following process descriptions and controls are generic examples of 
hypothetical teams, which at the time of writing did not exist at BNP Paribas in Lisbon. 
The examples are intended solely for illustrative purposes and do not reflect or have any 
connection to the actual processes or controls performed by any team at BNP Paribas in 
Lisbon.   
  
4.3.1 The Hypothetical Trading Team 
 
In the equity market, market makers would provide different prices on a product 
depending on their position, meaning whether they are long, in that they are offering to buy 
the product, or short, which is if they are selling the product. This hypothetical market 
making trading team offers a range of standardized products to both retail and institutional 
clients daily with the goal of offering competitive prices. When providing a new product, 
the trader develops a defined strategy that takes into consideration certain factors such as 
the margins, payoff, entry and exit points, duration of trade, the underlying, the quantities, 
hedging criteria, and the list goes on. Once the strategy has been defined, the trader must 
set specific parameters, which is specific to the product being issued.  
 
Table 3: Control on Pricing and Parameterizations 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
Pricing and 
Parameterizations 
Daily Mispricing 
This control would potentially 
ensure that the trader has 
considered the necessary criteria in 
order to set the appropriate price 
and the relevant parameters for that 
particular product. 
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The frequency of the control depends on the process, since in this scenario products 
are offered on a daily basis; the risk of a potential mispricing is daily. Thus, this control 
holds the trader accountable for ensuring that he or she has set the correct price on a daily 
basis. 
 Traders must also be aware of events that could have an impact on the product that 
they are issuing, such as geopolitical events, macroeconomic figures, and corporate actions. 
Corporate actions are particularly important since it would undoubtedly directly affect the 
securities issued by that particular company. The objective is to reduce a potential price 
jump; therefore the objective is to have the price before a corporate action be more or less 
the same price after the corporate action. There should not be any mispricings that could 
potentially impact the product that an investor is holding. This requires some calculations 
and simulations on the trader’s part, in order to predict how the product will be and how its 
barrier, parity, volatility, etc. will change.  
 
Table 4: Control on potentially impactful events and corporate actions 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
potentially 
impactful 
events and 
corporate 
actions 
Weekly/M
onthly 
Follow up 
Failure, 
Mispricing, 
This control would potentially ensure that 
the trader has closely monitored events 
that could cause a mispricing or give rise 
to an arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, the 
trader must take the measures necessary 
by either making adjustments or even 
removing the product from the market to 
avoid the potential of a price jump. 
 
 Since potentially impactful events do not happen on a daily basis, this control 
monitors whether the traders are following up on a weekly or monthly basis. The risk of not 
following up could result in a financial impact on the desk from that trade.  
A trader must have knowledge of the financial impacts that each trade can have, 
whether positive or negative, and he should always have an exit strategy before even 
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entering the position. Otherwise, the losses incurred from any particular trade could be 
insurmountable and catastrophic. The risk would be a Misexecution, in that the trader has 
poorly executed the trade and its strategy by not implementing a Stop Loss Order. 
 
Table 5: Control on Stop Loss Order 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
Stop Loss 
Order 
Strategy 
Daily Misexecution 
This control would potentially certify that 
the trader has established an order that 
would immediately close the position 
should the trade go in a losing direction. 
 
 It goes without saying that traders should operate under the rules of the market and 
the regulations, however risk control measures are needed to help ensure ad monitor that 
these rules are respected. In order to prevent rogue trading from going undetected, many 
investment banks have increased their monitoring and set up certain controls. One example 
is having a minimum period that the trader should be away on vacation so that any 
suspicious activity would be uncovered during that time. The following are several controls 
that any investment bank should have in order to reduce the probability of rogue trading 
from occurring.  
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Table 6: Control Plan Example List 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
risk limits and 
exposure 
Daily 
Poor position 
oversight 
This control would theoretically safeguard 
the bank from a particular level of risk 
exposure. Thus, this control would 
ascertain that the trader has not surpassed 
the market risk limits that have been 
predetermined.  
Control on 
Profit and 
Loss 
Reconciliation 
Weekly 
Failure in  
Reconciliation 
This control would hypothetically make 
sure that the last Profit and Losses 
reported by the Middle office matches the 
trader’s calculations. Any discrepancies 
would be analysed and explained or fixed.  
Control on 
market rules, 
regulations, 
and 
compliance 
Monthly 
Breach of 
market rules 
and 
regulations 
This control would potentially guarantee 
that the trader has obeyed market rules, 
regulations, and compliance in each of the 
trades performed. 
Control on 
minimum 
holiday period 
Annually Internal Fraud 
This control would ideally enforce a block 
leave period for its traders in order to help 
the bank detect if any fraud or rogue trading 
is occurring. 
 
Traders must have a predetermined risk limit that they must stay within when 
performing each trade, if not respected they risk exposing the bank to more risk than the 
bank intended. Additionally, a trader’s profits and losses should not only be monitored, but 
also reported on a constant basis. This is not only to ensure at the trader is not hiding a 
substantial amount of losses, but also to raise a red flag of a potential rogue trader. Thus, 
the amount that the trader reports should match the amount stated by the middle office, 
however if it does not then the necessary adjustments should be made.  
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Ultimately, the goal is to mitigate or prevent potential operational risk that all of the 
teams pose with their day to day processes. These descriptive controls represent the type of 
customized controls that we developed for each team, once we analysed the type of risk that 
each process contained.  
 
4.3.2 The Hypothetical Structuring Team 
 
The structuring team develops customized products to address the different needs of 
a wide range of clients, which can entail financial institutions, retail and corporate clients, 
to even governments. A structured product is a tailored investment strategy composed of 
derivatives, such as securities, options, commodities, currencies, etc. A structurer must not 
only be concerned with developing products that meet the complex needs of the clients but 
that also satisfy the needs of the bank.  
Since structurers are dealing with non-standardized products, it is imperative that 
they understand how to appropriately price the products created that can handle volatility 
and different market environments. 
 
Table 7: Control on Pricing 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
Pricing 
Daily Mispricing 
This control would potentially ensure 
that the structurer has considered the 
necessary quantitative models and 
criteria in order to set the appropriate 
price for the specific products. 
 
 Different products will be at different stages of execution, thus a structurers concern 
would not solely be pricing. There would also be products that would have closed, and in 
order to ensure that the financial needs of the clients are being met, the structurer should 
review the performance of that product and work to adapt future products to consistently 
improve the products being created. 
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Table 8: Control on closed product follow up 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
closed 
product 
follow up 
Weekly 
Follow up 
failure 
This control would potentially ensure 
that the structurer has reviewed the 
performance of the product and has 
made the necessary adaptations. 
 
 Although the regulatory framework for non-standardized products can be unclear 
due to products falling within legal grey areas, a structure must be mindful of the potential 
regulatory breaches and avoid them when creating new products.   
 
Table 9: Control on abiding regulations 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
abiding 
regulations 
Monthly 
Breach of 
market rules 
and regulations 
and Legal 
Issues 
This control would potentially ensure 
that the structurer has taken into 
account the pertinent regulations and 
has ensured that the customized 
product does not in any way 
potentially breach market regulations. 
 
4.3.3 The Hypothetical Marketing Team 
 
The marketing team in an investment bank prepares the advertising material of the 
standardized products offered to investors worldwide by the bank. When developing new 
marketing material, the marketing team must ensure that the material is ethical, in that it 
does not mislead investors in any particular way. The material should also be accompanied 
with the appropriate disclaimers to circumvent any potential consumer loss of confidence in 
the financial system. This is to avoid any misleading adverts that could promote false 
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financial information and lead to investor loss, which would severely damage a client’s 
relationship with the bank.  
The hypothetical marketing team’s goal is to entice the client to do business with 
the bank through an accurate portrayal of the range of standardized products that the bank 
offers with honest financial promotion.  
 
Table 10: Control Plan on Marketing Material 
 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on  
Marketing 
Information 
Rules and 
Consumer 
Confidence 
Daily 
Breach of 
marketing  
regulation rules 
This control would potentially ensure 
that the marketing team has taken the 
appropriate measures to safeguard 
consumer confidence by placing the 
appropriate financial information in 
its marketing material as well as the 
relevant disclaimers. 
Control on 
material 
accuracy 
Daily 
Misleading 
Marketing 
Information 
This control would have the 
marketing team confirm that the 
information stated in the documents 
is, to the best of their knowledge, 
reliable, accurate, viable and relevant. 
 
The frequency of the control, in this instance, would be daily since the team should 
be concerned with accurate and updated information on all its marketing material. The risk 
of not following legal or regulatory requirements or product literature that is incomplete or 
outdated should be a constant concern for the marketing team as not complying could 
potentially result in a fine or lawsuit.  
Information is key in the investment world and it is of great importance that the 
marketing team treats the sensitive information that it has with the appropriate caution. 
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Thus, it is of imperative that they always ensure that the appropriate information reaches 
the relevant people.  
 
Table 11: Control on releasing the appropriate information 
 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
releasing the 
appropriate 
information 
to the 
relevant 
people 
Daily Miscommunication 
This control would ideally ensure 
that the marketing team sends the 
right information to the appropriate 
person.  
 
 Therefore, the aforementioned control would be to ensure that the team takes the 
necessary measures to protect and deliver the necessary information to the relevant people. 
Since the marketing team communicates information on a daily basis, the frequency of this 
control would also be daily.  
 
4.3.4 Hypothetical Sales Team 
 
 The sales team works in collaboration with the traders, structurers, marketing team 
to help meet the clients’ financial needs. Similar to the marketing team, the sales team 
should be weary of not giving wrong information or the right information to the wrong 
client. This would also be in regards to the types of arrangements and products that the 
sales team organizes with the clients, ensuring that it would also be feasible for the traders 
and the structurers to accomplish. 
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Table 12: Control on external communications 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control 
Plan 
Control on 
external 
communications 
Weekly/Monthly Miscommunication 
This control would 
potentially ensure that the 
sales team has taken into 
account the pertinent 
information that they will 
reveal and the agreements 
that they would make.  
 
 The sales team in particular forms part of the representation of the bank that it is 
performing business for. Therefore, the sales team poses a reputational risk to the bank and 
should always ensure that all of their interactions fall in line with the bank’s policy. 
 
Table 13: Control on ethical product selling 
 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
ethical 
product 
selling 
Daily 
Reputational 
Risk 
This control would ideally ensure that 
the all of its sales interactions are 
professional, ethical and done 
according to bank policy.  
 
One control that has not been previously mentioned but would be pertinent for all 
the teams is an operational risk control escalation. This control would ensure that if an 
adverse event occurs that does not fall within the scope of the other controls, that the Front 
Officers still have a way of reporting these issues. Thus, this would be one of the several 
common controls that would form part of all officers performing tasks.   
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Table 14: Control on operational risk escalation 
 
Control Plan Frequency Risk Involved Objective of the Control Plan 
Control on 
operational 
risk 
escalation 
Daily 
Operational 
Risk 
This control would ideally ensure that 
the any operational risk has been 
appropriately informed and escalated 
even if it did not fall within the scope of 
the other controls.  
4.4 Creating the Control Model 
 
Once the risk mapping and control plan has been established, the team can now 
design the control model in ARIS. ARIS is a tool that facilitates the creation of the 
organizational structure, as well as the controls to manage the processes. The utilization of 
this tool follows several rules and steps, which will be described further in the following 
sections.  
 
4.4.1 ARIS Business Designer Modelization 
 
ARIS Business Designer, referred to as ABD from here on out, is a tool used to 
create, manage, analyze and administer the control plan models for front officers and their 
organization. There are very specific modeling rules which must be respected when 
creating scripts and models within ABD, which will be discussed in further detail within 
this section. Once the modeling is complete in ABD, it is then used to generate the ARCM, 
also called ORUS FO. ARCM is the website in which the front officers see their controls, 
can validate them, and, if relevant, mention any operational risks they encountered while 
performing their processes. 
Within ABD there are several different databases, which contain specific projects 
regarding Back Office, Middle Office and Front Office. There are certain objects that all 
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projects have in common and they are stored in the “000 – ORUS common objects.” In 
regards to control plans for front officers, we are only concerned with the Risks folder. 
 
Figure 4: ARIS Risk Mapping 
 
 
 
The risks folder is a sort of library that contains all the risks categories developed 
within the risk mapping process. Thus, the risk folder represents the risk categories that are 
reduced by the controls developed. Since various controls can reduce the same risk, these 
objects will have re-occurrences in several models. OPC created this risk cartography, and 
thus we are in charge of creating or modifying the risk names, if needed.  
When designing the control plans for front officers for ARCM, the process must be 
managed and monitored through clients. Clients are classified by the main regions that the 
front officers are based out of, such as Asia (AS), London (LN), Paris (PA) and the 
Americas (A1 and A2).  
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Figure 5: Client Folder list 
 
 
Within the BNP FO folder, there are three main folders that we use: 01- 
Authorisations, 02 - Organisation and 03- Processes. The Authorizations folder is an 
organization chart that sets people’s identities, access rights along with their teams and 
managers.  Within the folder, there are several models but only two will be discussed as it 
concerns the creation of teams, those are Tester Group and Tester Hierarchy. 
Figure 6: The Authorisations folder 
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As can be seen in the image above, tester group is separated by client and then 
within that by business line. The tester group contains the users that actually utilize ORUS 
and are organized by Role and Internal Person. The Role and the Internal person represent 
one person, however the internal person contains information such as the ID number and 
email of the Front officer. The internal person is the user and the Role will connect the 
internal person to the access rights. 
 
Figure 7: Users' Profile 
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Each Role will be linked to the tester group, their internal person as well as the 
internal person of their manager, who will be the one reviewing their controls. As shown in 
Figure 8:  
Figure 8: Hierarchal Tree of Users 
 
In the hierarchal tree, the Head of Filiere (HoF) is the top manager who reviews the 
Head of Desk.  
1. Since the HoF is not reviewed by anyone, only his internal person is connected 
to the Role, which is then connected to the Tester group.    
2. The HoF reviews the controls of the HoD, thus Role of the HoD will be linked 
to two internal persons, its own and the manager.  
3. The HoD manages the members of his team, and thus his internal person would 
be attached to the Role of the team member that he oversees. Therefore, the 
Role should have the same name as the internal person that it represent and will 
be attached to that member, as well as the manager that will be reviewing the 
controls. 
1 
2 
3 
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The second folder, within Authorizations, is the Tester Hierarchy which is a 
technical folder that essentially connects a Role to a hierarchy diagram. This is an 
organizational diagram that simply reflects the organization for the Front office within one 
location. 
 
Figure 9: Organization Within a Location 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Similar to the Authorisations folder, the Organisation folder also contains an 
organizational chart but this chart contains each client and is organized by business line. 
Within the chart the roles of each member are assigned to a team and an organization level.   
 
Figure 10: The Organizational Units By Levels 
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The Organizational units reflect the organization through four organizational levels: 
 Business Unit 
 Sub-Business Unit 
 Filiere 
 Desk 
Figure 11: FXLM Example of the Organizational Levels 
 
In this example, the Business Unit is Forex and Local Markets (FXLM), there can 
be several Sub-Business Unit, such as FXLM Marketing, FXLM Sales, FXLM Trading, as 
portrayed above, etc., that would all connect to the larger Business Unit. Filiere is the third 
organizational unit and it is comprised of all the desks that fall within that division. The 
Head of Filiere, in this case Pappu Kaur, would be linked to this division and he would 
oversee and review the controls for all the HoD’s of the desks that fall within that division. 
Each desk is linked to a location and the HoD, in this instance it is Zhang Sa in London, 
and the rests of his team members that he will be reviewing are linked thereafter.   
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Figure 12: The Process Folder 
 
 
 The Process folder is organized by client, such as BNPFOA1, and each client 
contains a folder with the separate business domains. So within BNFOA1, there could be a 
folder for Trading, Sales, etc., which can then be further subdivided into Sub Business 
Units. The business domain will be comprised of the “Value added chain diagram” 
(VACD) model, which contains Macro-processes and process objects as well as “Business 
Unit” folders, which contain each process assignments.   
 
Figure 13: The Value Added Chain 
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 As shown in the image above, all value added chain diagrams begin with the 
Business domain, in this instance it is Trading. Trading is then linked to a profile within the 
client, in this instance BNPFOA1 – Trading, the first Macroprocesses. The “Business Unit” 
Macroprocesses, FXLM in this instance, is linked to the first Macroprocesses and is 
subordinate to the first. The Sub Business Unit, in this case, FXLM Trading, is subordinate 
to the Business Unit and are assigned a new model called Event Process Chain, or EPC 
hereinafter. 
The EPC model is used to sort activities and controls and it is where all control 
objects are stored. The EPC model linked with the Sub Business Unit process is stored in a 
specific folder, FXLM Trading as shown in the image above. FXLM Trading, as all other 
Sub Business Unit folders, contains the control folders that hold the Business Control 
diagram. Each activity or control object with an active status must be connected to a unique 
EPC. So there will be one activity per EPC that can be linked to several controls as shown 
below. 
Figure 14: The Event Process Chain 
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Every “Control” mentioned in this EPC must have an occurrence in a Business 
Control diagram (BCD) through an assignment that will connect it to a new BCD model, 
portrayed by the green and red tripod above. The Business control diagram is comprised of 
the control that is to reduce one specific risk, which is obtained from the aforementioned 
ORUS Common Objects. Risks are stored in the Risks Folder and copied into the Business 
Control diagram representing its mitigation through the controls. 
 Each Control object must be connected to at least one “Test Definition” object, 
which defines the attributes of the control for that specific user. The Test definition will 
contain the name of the control, the time of generation, the frequency, and the time limit 
that the particular FO will have to complete that particular control. 
 
Figure 15: Business Control Diagram 
 
 
 Once all the controls have been created for that specific team it is now ready to be 
imported into ARIS Risk & Compliance Manager (ARCM). 
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 To summarize, there are two main processes in regards to developing the ARIS 
Model. There are the organizational aspects, such as the Tester group and tester hierarchy, 
and the management aspects, such as the VACD, the EPC and the BCD.    
 
Figure 16: Global View of the ARIS Modelization Process 
 
4.4.2 ARIS Risk & Compliance Manager 
 
 Once the processes have been designed, the process is ready to be introduced and 
viewed in the ARCM internal website system. ARCM is a safe and shared system that 
allows Front Officers to see and validate their controls, as well as raise any issues that they 
may have encountered when performing their processes. Moreover, ARCM offers a two-
way interaction between Front Officers and OPC team, since the team can also comment 
and inform the Front Officer through those controls of any potential vulnerabilities that the 
OPC team would have spotted.  
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Figure 17: ARCM Control Plan View 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the figure below, we are observing the access view of Joao Ninguem, who is an 
HoF. As previously mentioned, an HOF also monitors the control completion of the people 
within his team, which is why in this scenario he can also see the profile of Zhang SA and 
Jane Doe. Otherwise, normal Front Officers would only have access view and validation 
rights to their controls only.  
 
Figure 18: Pre-assessment Comment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The figure above portrays a message that an OPC team member could send to a 
Front Officer, who is being informed of a process that requires an action as to avoid a risk. 
The risk Pre-assessment is red to signify that the risk of not performing that particular 
process is high. Thus, the OPC team has managed to detect a potential risk early and inform 
the Front Officer involved so that an action to avert this particular risk is taken. Therefore, 
ARCM is an effective systematic tool of managing, controlling and mitigating the potential 
risks.   
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4.5 Hypothetical to Reality 
The importance of an efficient operational risk management system truly becomes 
apparent after actual events occur that prove to be cataclysmic for the financial institutions 
involved. Many times these events, in hindsight, show that preliminary steps could have 
been taken to either reduce their impact or completely prevent them from happening. These 
events highlight the vulnerabilities that financial institutions face by not establishing strong 
systematic and effective operational risk defense systems.  
There have been several high profile operational risk incidents that have proven 
costly for the financial institutions impacted. Three high profile cases were that of Barings 
Bank, Société Générale and UBS, each of which separately experienced losses above the 
billions due to the sole activities of one of their traders. Although these rogue traders were 
ultimately at the root of these catastrophic events, the actual problem began with the lack of 
a strong systematic approach to managing operational risk. Within the Basel Committee’s 
definition of operational risk, the risk of loss resulting from people is a risk that banks’ 
need to constantly address (BCBS, 2001).  
Through unauthorized speculative trades, trader Nick Leeson amassed losses of 
over $1 billion USD at Barings Bank, ultimately bankrupting the bank (Hoch et al., 2001). 
However, the lax management structure at Barings Bank also contributed to its own 
collapse as it had provided an environment in which Nick Leeson could go undetected with 
his risky transactions until it was too late. Although the Bank of England acknowledged 
Nick Leeson as the only culprit of the fraud, it stated that there also existed a “serious 
failure of controls and managerial confusion within Barings” (Hoch et al., 2001). 
In similar cases, Jérôme Kerviel and Kweku Adoboli also conducted unauthorized 
trades that cost their respective banks, Société Générale and UBS, billions. In 2008, Jérôme 
Kerviel had incurred a 4.9 billion Euro loss at Société Générale from duplicitous trading 
transactions (Gilligan, 2011). Three years later, UBS found itself in a similar situation 
having declared losses of $2.3 billion USD suffered from the deceitful synthetic equity 
trades of Kweku Adoboli (Gilligan, 2011). However, these are not isolated incidents, since 
the collapse of Barings Bank in 1995 there have been several prominent cases of rogue 
trading incidents that have led to financial institutions incurring losses into the billions. 
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However, operational risk does not necessarily solely occur with one single 
perpetrator. There are instances in which misconduct can occur at a bigger scale that leads 
to an environment in which it is embedded on a day-to-day basis. The London Interbank 
Offered Rate (LIBOR) manipulation scandal is one example of fraudulent actions that 
occurred on a mass scale and relied on nonexistent or weak operational risk management 
systems. The LIBOR is a group of rates established by a “panel” of “contributor banks” 
that represent the borrowing rates of ten different currencies (McConnell, 2013). The 
LIBOR fixing process relied on the “trust” and impartial opinion of these experts, however 
what occurred instead was a manipulation of the LIBOR rates that benefitted particular 
individuals and firms to the detriment of borrowers around the world (McConnell, 2013). 
The LIBOR rates scandal was not an isolated even but a systematic widespread “business-
as-usual” manipulation that involved many managers and traders from different 
organizations (McConnell, 2013).  
One major operational risk vulnerabilities that the LIBOR rates process possessed 
was that the oversight and sanctions were regulated by the contributing banks themselves 
(McConnell, 2013).  In other words, there was a lack of management systems that were 
judicious, transparent and ensured an ethical estimation of the rates. Furthermore, it seems 
that several entities and individuals within and outside of the “panel” were aware to some 
degree that the LIBOR process contained misleading or inaccurate reports (McConnell, 
2013). This indicates a lack of accountability in regards to reporting potential misconduct 
occurring amongst the experts. The manipulation was found to be a nearly quotidian 
occurrence involving multiple traders, submitters of rates, and managers (McConnell, 
2013). Furthermore, it was found that some rate submitters were also derivatives traders 
themselves who based their submissions on their own desk’s trading positions (McConnell, 
2013).   
Ultimately, these cases illustrate the impact that an inefficient or nonexistent 
operational risk management system could have on a financial institution. They emphasize 
the importance of implementing operational risk management systems that would 
potentially protect financial institutions, and ultimately the financial markets, from being 
negatively impacted by operational risk that can result in catastrophic events.   
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Chapter V 
5. Conclusion 
Notable operational risk incidents, such as those of rogue traders Nick Leeson at 
Barings Bank, Jérôme Kerviel at Société Générale, and Kweku Adoboli at UBS, highlight 
the potential consequences of not establishing strong and efficient operational risk 
management systems. Each of these aforementioned traders caused their banks billions due 
to unauthorized transactions that they undertook, and in the case of Nick Leeson led to the 
collapse of the bank (Gilligan, 2011). In hindsight, had these unauthorized transactions 
been caught earlier the financial impact could have been much smaller and possibly 
insignificant. Therefore, these incidents also highlight that there existed standardized and 
structural drivers within the environment of these financial institutions that allowed for 
these events to occur and thus ultimately contributed to their own demise.  
However, misconduct does not solely occur as isolated events from one individual 
at a financial firm. As the LIBOR scandal illustrated, the origins may begin small but can 
escalate into a large global systematic way of conducting business. Thus, efficient 
operational risk management systems are crucial not only to helping financial institutions 
curve the potential impacts that they face from operational risk but also to prevent these 
impacts from negatively spilling over into the financial markets.  
Ultimately, establishing a methodical and effective first line of defense is crucial for 
detecting potential risks as early as possible and, consequently, mitigating or completely 
avoiding the impact of those risks on the financial institution. Therefore, financial 
institutions must take defensive measures against potential risks in order to protect their 
financial, reputational, and/or operational stability from being negatively affected by 
unfavorable, unforeseeable events.  
In this study, we performed an internal analysis of the processes performed by the 
BNP Paribas Global Markets Front Office team in Lisbon in order to deduce if there was, in 
fact, a need for an operational risk management framework. We found that it was helpful 
and necessary to implement operational risk management frameworks. Therefore, we 
developed risk cartography as it pertained to the processes performed in Lisbon and, 
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subsequently, internal control systems with the objective of combating these identified 
risks. Although a complete risk-free environment does not exist, financial institutions 
should have the objective of reducing the occurrence and/or impact of these risks through 
strong operational risk management systems, which we achieved through the development 
and implementation of a tailored and comprehensive operational risk management model. 
This study has meaningful contributions to the literature since, to the best of our 
knowledge, it is the first case study performed on BNP Paribas Lisbon in regards to 
operational risk. We also deduced that this is the first study to simultaneously discuss the 
development of risk cartography and the implementation of a risk control system through 
ARIS. Furthermore, the study contributed to the operations of the BNP Paribas Lisbon 
office through the analysis and implementation of enhanced risk controls, which could 
ultimately help in limiting any potential impact of risks that could occur.  
The main limitation of this research was the sensitivity of the information that, 
because of confidentiality reasons, could not be used to further the study. It would have 
further enriched the study if we could have been able to use internal data. It would be 
interesting to see future research that delves into the quantitative aspects of operational risk 
management using the internal data of a bank.  
Furthermore, the Basel II Accord will soon be obsolete as banks begin to implement 
the Basel III Accord, thus, it would be intriguing if the subsequent research highlights the 
impact this new Accord will have in regards to the qualitative, as well as the quantitative 
aspects of guarding against operational risk.  
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